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Sūtra 49.

श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यमन्यविषया विशेषार्थत्वात् ॥ ४९ ॥

Śrutānumānaprajñābhyām anyaviṣayā viśeṣārthatvāt.

Śruta – something heard, verbal knowledge; *anumāna* – inference, inferential cognition; *prajñā* – wisdom; *anya* – other, different from; *viṣaya* – object, subject-matter; *viśeṣa* – particular, specifier; *artha* – entity, something known.

YS I.49: [It] is other than verbal and inferential wisdom, because its object is something particular.

Bhoja-vṛtti I.49: Since that wisdom is of different type, the author shows its differential characteristic: – "[The knowledge born out] of the verbal and inferential wisdom has for its object the universal [while the other wisdom is different] because its object is the particular."[1] – *Verbal* is the Scriptural knowledge, the characteristic of inference has already been mentioned. The wisdom born out of these two has for its object the universal. The word and the inferential mark, just like the senses, are not capable of comprehending the particular. That illuminating wisdom (*vaiśāradya*) springing from the *nirvicāra-samāpatti* differs characteristically from the other two, because it has for its object (*viśaya*) the particular. In that wisdom, even the particular [form] of the subtle, the veiled, and the distanced shines forth by its distinct form. That's why the *yogin* is given advice to exert a paramount effort in its acquisition.

Vyāsa-bhāṣya I.49:

सा पुनः, – श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यमन्यविषया विशेषार्थत्वात् ॥ श्रुतम् = आगम-विज्ञानम् , तत्सामान्यविषयम् । न ह्यागमेन शक्यो विशेषोऽभिधातुम् । कस्माद् ? न हि विशेषेण कृतसङ्केतः शब्द इति । तथाऽनुमानं सामान्यमेव । यत्र प्राप्तिस्तत्र गतिर्यत्रप्राप्तिस्तत्र न भवति गतिरित्युक्तम् । अनुमाने च सामन्येनोपसंहारः ।

तस्माच्छ्रुतानुमानविषयो न विशेषः कश्चिदस्तीति। न चास्य सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टस्य वस्तुनो लोकप्रत्यक्षेण ग्रहणमस्ति। न चास्य विशेषस्याप्रमाणिकस्याभावोऽस्तीति । समाधिप्रज्ञानिर्ग्राह्य एव स विशेषो भवति। भूतसूक्ष्मगतो वा पुरुषगतो वा, तस्माच्छ्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्यविषया सा प्रज्ञा विशेषार्थत्वाद् इति ॥ ४९ ॥

Śruta is Scriptural knowledge. Its object is the universal. Scripture is not capable of predicating the particular. Why not? Because being a convention, word is not created by the particular. Similarly, inference has for its object only the universal. For, as already said, wherever there is arrival, there is going (*gati*) too, and wherever there is no arrival, there is also no going.[2] The conclusion [arrived at] by means of inference refers to universal, and not [to particular].[3] Therefore the particular cannot be the object of verbal and inferential knowledge.

If it be urged that it subsists [in the form of an object of ordinary perception], this is not true, because ordinary perception is not capable of grasping the subtle, the veiled, and the distant objects.

– Then the particular, being not accessible by these instruments of adequate cognition, does not exist.

– This is also wrong. The particular does exist, and it is grasped in the wisdom of *samādhi*. It resides whether in the subtle elements or in the *puruṣa*. Hence that wisdom is other than verbal and inferential wisdom, because its object is something particular.

Bhāsvatī I.49:

[First of all, the commentator discusses the power of word to reveal the own-nature of the particular:] *Śruta*, etc. The particular is the principle of the endless variegation. It cannot be predicated by words, because words are conventional buildings having for their object the universal. Therefore the Scriptural authority, being born by words, has for its object the universal. Similar is the case with inference. Since it is a ground-processing cognition, [it is proper to say that] whatever part [of the general interconnection between the grounds] has been arrived at, this much will cover our going [into the particular]. The endless particulars cannot be arrived at through inference, because the knowledge of the innumerous particulars is impossible, and – basically – because inferential knowledge resides

in words. Hence the conclusion arrived at through inference, refers only to universals, and not [to ultimate particulars].

The commentator points out, too, that ordinary perception is not capable of grasping the subtle, the veiled, and the distant objects, and concludes: Scriptural word, inference and ordinary perception are not adequate instruments in knowing the particular. Though these three instruments of adequate cognition are not capable of grasping the particular, there is, however, no doubt that it is an object of a special kind of subtle cognition. And this [cognition] is the wisdom of *samādhi*, grasping the ultimate particulars of both subtle elements and *puruṣa* – the grasper.

Tattva-vaiśāradī I.49:

Let that be. The liaison-knowledge raising no hesitations (*nirvicāra-samāpatti*), being the culmination of the cognitive powers that have for their object what is grasped through verbal testimony and inference, should resort only to the object[4] of verbal and inferential cognition. A disposition left over while experiencing one object, cannot generate another kind of knowledge, because this is highly an illicit intercourse. Therefore the truth-bearing wisdom, declared to be the result of the raising no hesitations liaison-knowledge, should also be fastened to the objects of verbal and inferential cognition.

To this the author says: – "[It] is other than verbal and inferential wisdom, because its object is something particular." – Because the own-nature of the intellectual *sattva* is light, because it is capable of contemplating all objects. Veiled by *tamas*, it grasps only wherever that veil is lifted by *rajas*. When, however, *rajas* gets tamed, and the stigmas of *tamas* are washed away, when [the sun of] the wisely and aptly discriminating mind appears, then its object goes over the boundaries of all measurable things. And what might be the name for its unlimited light but *gocara* (transcendental horizon of all possible objects)?

The commentator explains: "*Śruta* is Scriptural knowledge; its object is the universal."

– Which are the reasons for saying that the word is uncapable of predicating the particular?

– Such reasons are the endlessness [of particulars], the logical inconsistency [of trying to predicate the particular by word], the fact

that word is a signification (convention), created not by the particular – because the particular is of no help in grasping the relation between signified and signifier; and, finally, because such particular is not capable of imparting sense to the sentence.

As for the inference, it is but a discursive understanding (*gati*) that is genetically dependent on the apprehension of the relation subsisting between the mark and the mark-bearer. [Having this in mind] the *bhāṣyakāra* says, "Similarly, inference," etc. The words *atra-tatra* [in the saying '*wherever* there is arrival, *there* is going too'] should – upon changing their places – be understood as *pervaded* and *pervading*.[5] Thus the conclusion is arrived at by means of inference and universal. The commentator concludes, "Therefore the universal," etc.

But the ordinary perception has no bearing to the apprehension of the [universal] connection, so it has for its object [the particular] rather than the universal.

"That is not the case." Indeed, it is not a proper claim to say that ordinary perception depends on the apprehension of the universal connection. But somehow it depends on the senses, and everything grasped therein is certainly not beyond the reach of our apprehension [while the ultimate particular is beyond the reach of the senses; it is *atīndriya*].

It might be objected that since the particular is not within the horizon of verbal knowledge, inference, and perception, it does not exist at all. For it is not accessible by any one of the means of adequate cognition.

The commentator replies, "This is also wrong," etc. The inefficacy of the proving instrument is not coextensive (*pervading*) with – or the cause of – the nonexistence of the cognitive object. Those who rely on these [natural] instruments of knowledge have no doubt that the 16-digital moon does really assume the deer-mark form[6] when marked by the corresponding digit. That's why what *is grasped in the wisdom of samādhi* is just the particular.

The atoms and souls under discussion take possession of unique particulars because, being ultimate substances, they should differ from each other. Those things that, being substances, differ from each other, like the sugarcane, the shorn-shaved [female] mendicant, etc., are possessed of unique particular. By this inference [the Nayāyikas] prove [the existence of the particular]. It is also

demonstrated by verbal authority taking recourse to the metaphor of truth-bearing wisdom. And since the descriptive reality of what has been described in this manner is exposed to doubts by the achievements of logic, how could the reality of That [particular], being something close and distant, come within the horizon[7] of verbal authority and inferential knowledge? It never becomes clear, like the things we define by accumulation of words and application of special techniques as enumeration of marks, etc.

Therefore it must be taken for granted that the particular is an object different from those of verbal and inferential wisdom.

Rahasya I.49:

The words "let that be" at the beginning of *Vācaspatya*, intend to put on doubt what is going to be said in the next *sūtra*, concerning the object of the truth-bearing wisdom. According to *Nyāya-sūtra*, the specific form (*ākṛti*) is something achieved in the course of processing general categories, and is not grasped outside the specification. It is a product of the differentiating intellect.[8] With the Nayāyikas, only the universal, to be precise, the general (*jāti*) is possessed of productive power (*śakti*). Inference, however, resorts only to universals, and when the particular is construed otherwise [i.e., without recourse to universal], the inferential wish falls apart.

This, however, is not the case. The greatness of the yogic perception lies precisely in the fact that it, to quote from the Śruti, grasps "all the *similia*, and all the *infinita*"; for, in it, the intellectual *sattva*, i.e.,

> "the *sattva*, having overpowered *rajas* and *tamas*,
> becomes pregnant [with truths]."

[Objection:] But the non-discursive (*anatikramaṇīya*) object claimed by you does simply not exist.

Just on the contrary. Vācaspati describes it as *transcendental*.[9] Thus the things are perfect. Moreover, Śruti says, "When the time of Mṛtyu[10] elapses, it turns into light." The meaning of this dictum is that, when devoid of the limitations created by sins, the intellect becomes infinite and gets the power of all-apprehension.

[The Nayāyika] does postulate that the particular is an object of

verbal and inferential knowledge – what we certainly refute, etc. Therefore the conclusion of Vyāsa is flawless. –

What is perfectly seen
in the contemplation of the distant and the subtle
by means of their proper unswerving mark,
gets adequately perceived by the ear.

Let us presume, goes on the Nayāyika, that this is true. Then:

The thing itself is running after
the dictum of the seers
that have taken once again sāṃsāric form.

In other words, the thing itself effectuates it intentionally.[11]

[The argument that atoms are inanimate is contravened by evidence] based on Śruti: "All things, forsooth, are animated by Truth, the truth about them is their truth."

[This might be true, but] *still there is no means to prove* [the independent existence of the particular].

If the criterion of cognition (*pramāṇa*) were the delimitor of the cognizable (*prameya*), then the lack of it would be the criterion of its nonexistence. Yet we cannot say, 'Wherever there is measure (*māna*) there is measurable (*meya*) too,' because the measure is not pervaded by the measurable. That's why Vācaspati speaks of *inefficacy*, etc. [If the *pūrvapakṣin* is right] then even the deer-marked moon could raise doubts as to its being possessed of horn.

The other object of the intellectual *sattva* is the soul (*ātmā*), which is not a sense-object. It is, therefore, said to be grasped in the wisdom of *samādhi*. "The Ātman gets understood by one single word," says even Udyotakara.[12] Therefore Vācaspati adduces his proof of the Vaiśeṣika category *viśeṣa*: "The atoms and souls under discussion," etc. The same is proved by Āgama, "[*Tat* is] the truth of the truth," "distant, and also near is That," "turned towards all, He stays," and many others. He gets closer when we cognize Him with the help of the universal, and becomes distant when trying to understand Him by means of particular. The name *Adūra-viprakarṣa* generates in our memory one single word – the word *Tat*. This is why Vācaspati says that it is not *like the things* which, just like Devadatta and Yajñadatta, are cognized by enumeration of [their identifying] marks or through [accumulation of] the meaning of the words constituting

their names (Given-by-god, and Given-through-sacrifice). Hence it comes to be known through yogic perception. Such is the meaning.

Yoga-vārttika I.49:

One may ask: "Since verbal and inferential cognition are instruments of adequate knowledge, why should the object of that [truth-bearing wisdom] be grasped by *yoga*, rather than only through these two?" In order to dispel this hesitation the commentator introduces the next *sūtra*, adding at the very beginning *it again* – "is other than verbal and inferential wisdom, because its object is something particular." It, the wisdom born in the universal meditation, has different object, transcending the objects of verbal and inferential cognition, because it is something particular. Its object is a special entity, hence that [wisdom], too, is very special.

The commentator explains why the object of the meditative wisdom does not coincide with those of verbal and rational knowledge. What is *heard* is the authoritative word. The word is not created by means of *specification*. The category (*padārtha*, meaning of the word, predicated object, predicable) gets its categoriality just because it has the form of delimitor (*avacchedaka*), and shines through the knowledge of the word, for otherwise there would rise logical inconsistency. The categorial delimitor is only the potness, etc., and not the specifiers (*viśeṣa*) of the corresponding objects. They are infinite and cannot be established at one accord, because the apprehension (*śakti-grāha*) processes this or that concrete form; because otherwise there would appear [the vicious circle of] mutual specification (*viśeṣaṇānyonya*, the specifier would be in need of another specifier), which is counterproductive; and because this would produce doubts in the universal validity of Śruti, its word being delimited by a specifier (which could be everything – from the concrete man, up to all the specific conditions of space, time, and causality).

What is now the peculiarity of inference? Having for its delimitor the power of pervasion, inference comes into being through the universal *gatitva*, etc., and not through this or that specific form of action.[13] And the conclusion arrived at by means of inference, *does refer to universal* – thus must be understood the proper connection between the words here.

[Objection:] Since the particular is not within the horizon of verbal

and inferential cognition, it should be grasped only by ordinary perception; for, as already stated, *yogaja*-perception is of no use here.

This is not true, "because ordinary perception is not capable" [of grasping the subtle, the intercepted, and the distant objects].

[Objection:] Then the particular does not exist, because of the lack of instruments to prove it.

The commentator disperses the doubt concerning the nonexistence [of what cannot be demonstrated by means of adequate knowledge]. "This is also wrong," [such instruments subsist, at least in their inferential mode, because] with the help of the rule [accepted by Nyāya, and saying] that the universal does not exist without the particular, we can always and everywhere prove the particular.

Thus, following the method of reduction, it is the particular that remains to be grasped in the wisdom of *samādhi*. And the commentator concludes, "Hence that wisdom is other," etc.

[Let's come back to] *samādhi*. It has been said that whenever the specifier gets within the horizon of some empirical perception of the gross element, the latter becomes repressed and the specifier sticks to the subtle element. Or to *puruṣa*. Hence, self-generated properties like particulars, etc., reside even in the *puruṣas*. There is, however, a prohibition to the effect that higher genera, like particularity, quality, substantiality, etc., cannot possess properties. Hence the past, the present, and the future specifiers reflect one or another conditional mode (*upādhi*) [in the existence of their substrata], being the basis for mutual differentiation between the *puruṣas* – emancipated and bounded, perfectly accomplished or striving for perfection.[14]

Well, inasmuch as there might have been no contact with the intercepted, past, etc. [substrata of properties], how is it that they are grasped through *samādhi* perception? Because the notorious yogic perception is also fancied to be based on contact!

This is not the case, because they are not achieved through physical conjunction, etc., because the object of this perception of the past, etc. [substrata] is not the cause of it.[15] And because, as already said, due to its capability of universal pervasion, ensuing from its proper sattvic nature, our internal organ (*manas*) is in a sempiternal contiguity with all past, present, and future [*dharmins*]. It is with the help of *yogaja*-perception that the stains of *tamas*, preventing the knowledge of what is hidden, past, etc., are erased. The same is summarized in

our commentary on *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* [I.91]: "Not a defect, because of the relation [subsisting between those who have] reached excellence, and the latent things."

So, forwarding to conclusion, Vyāsa resumes the meaning of the aphorism: "Therefore," etc. Thus everything seems to be concluded. [16] These words make us realize that (1) we are still not a specific object of contemplation because of our being devoid of the real specifier,[17] and that (2) among the followers of the deviating doctrines, there rise ever new senseless talks about *yogaja*-perception; for – as regards the things not mentioned in our *śāstra* – the right doctrine is only that of the two affiliated systems (Sāṃkhya-Yoga).

Sūtra 50.

तज्जः संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी ॥ ५० ॥

Tajjaḥ saṃskāro'nyasaṃskārapratibandhī.

Tat – that; *ja* – born; *saṃskāra* – disposition; *pratibandhī* – preventing.

YS I.50: The disposition born out of that is preventing the other dispositions.

Bhoja-vṛtti I.50: The author enunciates the fruit of that wisdom: – "The disposition", etc. – The disposition born out of that wisdom precludes the other dispositions generated by the ascent [of consciousness] and by *samādhi*, turning thus into an instrument for taming their effects. This is the meaning [of the sūtra]. Since the generated dispositions bearing the essential form of *tattva* are objectless [and in this sense independent of their substrate], they can obstruct the dispositions generated by the non-essential wisdom (*atattva-rūpa-prajñā*). Therefore it is said: That wisdom should constantly be exercised.

Vyāsa-bhāṣya I.50:

समाधिप्रज्ञाप्रतिलम्भे योगिनः प्रज्ञाकृतः संस्कारो नवो नवो जायते – तज्जः संस्कारोऽन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबन्धी ॥

समाधिप्रज्ञाप्रभवः संस्कारो व्युत्थानसंस्काराशयं बाधते, व्युत्थानसंस्काराभिभवात् तत्प्रभवा प्रत्यया न भवन्ति, प्रत्ययनिरोधे समाधिरुपतिष्ठते, ततः समाधिप्रज्ञा, ततः प्रज्ञाकृतः संस्कारा इति नवो नवः संस्काराशयो जायते, ततः प्रज्ञा ततश्च संस्कारा इति, कथमसौ संस्कारातिशयश्चित्तं साधिकारं न करिष्यतीति ? न ते प्रज्ञाकृताः संस्काराः क्लेशक्षयहेतुत्वाच्चित्तमधिकारविशिष्टं कुर्वन्ति, चित्तं हि ते स्वकार्यादवसादयन्ति, ख्यातिपर्यवसानं हि चित्तचेष्टितमिति ॥ ५० ॥

[Introduction:] On reaching the wisdom of *samādhi*, the disposition created by the wisdom of the *yogin* is being perpetually regenerated.

[Reads the *sūtra*, – "The disposition born out of that is preventing the other dispositions."]

[Commentary:] The disposition springing from the wisdom of *samādhi*, obstructs the ascending dispositional vehicle.[18] Due to its [capability of] overpowering the ascending dispositions [rising from the previous forms of meditation], their effective notions do not come into being. With the suppression of notions, *samādhi* gains in stability, then the wisdom born in *samādhi*, then the dispositions created by [that] wisdom.[19]

Thus an entirely new dispositional vehicle is being born.[20]

[You say that] afterwards comes the wisdom, then the dispositions. How is it that this dispositional vehicle is not under the jurisdiction of consciousness?

[It is not controlled by consciousness] because consciousness is under the specific jurisdiction of those wisely created dispositions which are the ground for the removal of afflictions, because they put an end to the [first] duty of consciousness. For the ambitions of consciousness are terminated by discriminating cognition.

Bhāsvatī I.50:

On reaching the wisdom of samādhi, the disposition brought into existence *by the wisdom of the yogin is being regenerated*. And this is a disposition that prevents the other dispositions, being their *pratipakṣa*, i.e., the *locus* where the ascending in the distracted [consciousness] dispositions do not exist.

The wise disposition springs from *reaching*, i.e., from starting to experience *the wisdom of samādhi*; then [come] the wise notions. For it is the growing expansion of the wise disposition that opposes

the distracted disposition [of mind] and discards it along with the notions born therefrom. The rest is easy.

Dispositional excellence (*atiśaya*) means multiplication of the wise disposition. Discriminating cognition dismisses [all distracted] wisdom. Then comes ataraxy (*vairagya*), then the end of effect-producing cognition, because discriminating cognition delimits the object-generated intentional horizon of consciousness.[21] The knowledge of the ultimate difference [between empirical and transcendental subject] being generated, there remains no trace of whatever object-generated intention [in the empirical consciousness, i.e., 'appetite for']. Discrimination is the crest-jewel of cognitive *yoga*.

Tattva-vaiśāradī I.50:

[Objection:] Let that be. Let cognitive *yoga*, having for its object the metaphysical entities, come from the continued exercise of the said means. Thus, thanks to the dispositions ascending from eternity, the wisdom of *samādhi* gets overflowed by obstacles and drifted by pragmatic-conventional meanings. It is like the atom of light amidst the roaring storm [i.e., like the eye of the hurricane].

Introducing the *sūtra* [the commentator] dispels this hesitation with the words: "On reaching the wisdom of *samādhi*," etc., then reads the *sūtra*: – "The disposition born out of that is preventing the other dispositions." –

Here *tat* refers to the liaison-knowledge raising no hesitations.[22] *Anya* means other ascending [dispositions of consciousness]. For the own-nature of consciousness is to be directed towards something.[23] When not fixed, the intellect rambles and misses the real essence of the things. When [the real entity has been] reached to some extent, the intellect, dwelling in this unsteady position and full of dispositions, goes on to be whirled by the wheel of attitudes. It is this whirling, beginningless at that, that obstructs the course of dispositional intellect towards the real entity.

Here the outsiders[24] do also pin down their position:

Distorted concepts about the own-nature
of the imminent essence,

though beginningless, are not obstruction,
for the intellect is intentionally directed towards it.

Suppose [Vyāsa] is right in saying that *samādhi* is suppression of the ascending dispositions. Born in *samādhi*, [the capacity of] overpowering the dispositions is the genetic ground for the *wisdom of samādhi*. Up to this point, everything is flawless. Yet consciousness would have to take seize on that state, too. Hence the question, "How is it that this dispositional vehicle is not under the jurisdiction of consciousness?"

[The commentator] refutes this objection: "Because consciousness is under the specific jurisdiction of those wisely created dispositions," etc. The duties of consciousness are two – enjoyment of sound, color, and the other [sense-qualities], and Discrimination Knowledge. Here the duty supported by the vehicle of afflictions and deeds gets realized in the enjoyment of sound, etc., while the other duty [of the conscious man having, under the jurisdiction] of the wisely born dispositions, entirely eradicated the vehicle of afflictions and deeds, is the pure Discrimination Knowledge [born out] of the perfect and excellent power of consciousness (*cetas*). Therefore the meditative dispositions are not grounds for subjugating consciousness to the power of enjoyment. On the contrary, they are barriers on its way, in the sense that only they put an end, deprive consciousness of its first duty, i.e., make it impotent to enjoy.

Why?

Because the ambitions of consciousness are terminated by discriminating cognition. When enjoyment feeds up the ambitions of consciousness, it is not capable of perceiving the knowledge of the ultimate difference. However, in the presence of the conceived Discrimination Knowledge, when the afflictions are desactivated, the enjoyment, too, is out of power. This is the import.

The main purpose of wise dispositions here is to pacify and subjugate the enjoyment [found in empirical cognition].

Rahasya I.50:

Prior to the sublime generation
is being born just non-obstruction. –
There's otherwise no rise of the Higher,

provided life is not an obstacle.

Thus reads the popular maxim. Even the beginningless [can] be obstructed by what has a beginning.[25] Therefore the author says: – "The disposition born out of that is preventing the other dispositions." – The *samādhi* disposition opposes the ascent of the other dispositions. This is the meaning [of the *sūtra*].

[Vācaspati is confident that the beginningless whirling] *does actually obstruct*.[26] The verses in the commentary represent the opponent's thesis [refuting the necessity of impeding the dispositions and holding that what we need here is to dispel the distorted concepts]. The object is an accessory to the essential knowledge. Delusion is not an accessory. Now they speak of *imminent essence* (*nirupadrava-bhūtārtha*), etc. The four kinds of distorted concepts that injure [*upadrava*, elude or bring calamities to the cognition of the imminent essence] are the antecedent concepts, the instrumental concepts, the dominant concepts, and the object concepts.[27] Though beginningless, they are not an obstacle to the intellect, i.e., to the cognition of truth. Such is the meaning.

Still they are found in *samādhi*. How is it that they are not under the jurisdiction of consciousness?

[Because the very consciousness is distracted, while] the said wisdom of *samādhi* is not distracted. Moreover, it is *not genetically* based [on overpowering the dispositions], so that not everything is flawless.[28]

As for the enjoyment [found in the cognition of external objects] and emancipation, they are the real purpose of man. Out of these two, the enjoyment [found in the cognition of external objects] is effectuated through the instrumental help of the vehicle of afflictions and deeds. As for the ground of emancipation, *viz*., the Discriminative Knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*), its accessory is the *samādhi* disposition, which deprives consciousness, or, resorting to the perfect locution of Vācaspati, renders it impotent [to enjoy].

The popular maxim says that this power is demoniac, because – this should be added –if possessed of complete power, one has nothing left to do. [The new impeding dispositions] put barriers on the way, i.e., exterminate his ambitions – all that substantiates his afflictions, deeds, etc., – just like the forest-conflagration devastates the germing power of all seeds.

The commentator is going to explain that the wise cognitions of the previous meditations alluded to in the next *sūtra* are capable of producing [new] dispositions: – "On reaching the wisdom of *samādhi*," etc.

It could be asked, "What is the result of the self-inductive circuit (*utpatti-paryanta*) subsisting between wisdom and *yoga* [i.e. restraining meditation]?" For, as soon as wisdom appears, it is exposed to serial cognitive meditations.[29]

Having in mind this hesitation, the author says: – "The disposition born out of that is preventing the other dispositions." – Prevention means contraposing the effect.[30]

This precisely is going to say the commentator, by using the word *bādha* (obstruction, obstacle). And the destruction of all dispositions comes only from the destruction of [the distorted modifications of] consciousness, this also will be specified in the commentary. The word 'obstructs' does perfectly manifest the meaning of the *sūtra*. If we analyze the phrase 'obstructs the ascending dispositional vehicle', we shall see that 'disposition' and 'vehicle' are compounded into one word, and the vehicle, specified in this manner, gets deprived of productivity. We have thus 'vehicle of dispositions,' i.e., dispositional vehicle, and 'unawakened disposition.' No obstruction of awakened (*udbuddha*) dispositions is possible, because the meaning of the word *bādha* is just contraception of awakening (*udbodha*). This is the pith.

It might be objected that since the [ordinary yogic] disposition restraining the modifications of consciousness gains in power, it is capable of overpowering the ascending dispositions, too. Then why should the wise *samādhi* disposition try also to overpower the ascending dispositions?

This is not a correct question, because it is established that the proclaimed 'yogic restraint' (*yukti*), characterized by lack of modifications, continues to generate dispositions. This, however, cannot be said of any restraint of modifications brought about in the seasons of cognitive [meditation]. Smṛti also presents supportive grounds to the point, while proclaiming that the goal of overpowering the ascending dispositions may be achieved only through the wise disposition.

One may ask: "Since every single wisdom or every single series of wise meditations generates dispositions turning into ascending dispositional obstacles, does the continued performance of cognitive meditations make any sense at all?"

The commentator replies, "Due to its [capability of] overpowering the ascending dispositions," etc., up to the "dispositions created by [that] wisdom," all is performed for the sake of overpowering, etc., – the rest is clear. This is the core.

Cognitive meditation does not obstruct the [ascending] dispositions all at once; because Śruti and Smṛti occasionally mention the ever new ascent, and because there are no instructions [pointing to the other alternative]. Nevertheless, the disposition born *seriatim* in cognitive meditations gets stronger and finally turns into obstruction. Delicate and unsteady as they are in the beginning, the dispositions do gradually and relentlessly – due to their growing communication – create a mighty obstacle. Similarly, the stability of that [confining] disposition depends on the wheel of the cognitive dispositions.

Evidently, this is the knowledge that removes also the hesitations [i.e., the distorted notions of those who are doubting] the power [of the wise disposition] to obstruct the ascending dispositions. For, when the unified wisdom becomes obstacle to the dispositions, there could be no ascent [of distorted concepts, too]. The ascent, etc., of concepts that confine the power of the wise disposition to obstruct the ascending notions is a clear evidence that the latter does not pertain to the class of the stabilized dispositions. And, among the ascending dispositions, the peculiarity of the ignorant one is such that the wheel of the wise dispositions slows down when [the ignorant disposition is] obstructed by the disposition born in the once appeared wisdom. This will be clarified in the two canonical *sūtras*, the first one of which reads, "*Te pratiprasavaheyāḥ sūkṣmāḥ*."[31] So, in this and the other *sūtra* of ours, they become confined, because what is meant there is the fruit of *yoga* upon the total destruction of dispositions. The quickest emancipation proceeds by overcoming the precommenced *karma*. The common result of both *yogas* is the pure emancipating knowledge. However, upon the restless destruction of hedonistic disposition, the precommenced *karma* continues to obstruct the acquisition of the fruit, because there is no apparent ground [for maintaining the opposite point of view], as well as because in such sentences as "Slowly accrue deeds burnt up in the fire of *yoga*," etc., there is no proof that this

process could be abridged. In other sentences, such as "The fire of knowledge [burns up] all deeds," etc., we apprehend the possibility of abridgement, because – as mentioned in other Vedic utterances about knowledge – "When present, this proceeds quickly," and because there are no instructions pointing to the contrary. *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* and V*edānta-sūtra* also speak of the necessity [to eradicate] the recommenced enjoyment of the cognizers.[32]

If one objects that there is no time-regulation of the results in destroying afflictions and recommenced deeds, this is not so, because what is said in the *śāstras* does strictly regulate the time for the destroying and destroyed deeds. Due to the karmic, etc., peacefulness of consciousness, first comes the cooking of the deeds, rendering them unproductive, then the afflicting sins also loose their destructive power.

Yet it is the fruition that is setting the boundary between destroying and destroyed deeds mentioned in the *śāstras*.

That's right.

Then why do you say that upon overpowering [the ascending dispositions], which is exercised with excellence by the wise disposition, a new disposition will be born? It follows that even the transcognitive *yoga* will not destroy the dispositions.

That is not the case, because one can reach the highest goal of Liberation even in the absence of transcognitive *yoga*, by skipping the recommenced perfections and following the exclusive way of pure emancipating knowledge.

This, however, raises new hesitations. "How is it that this [new] dispositional mechanism is not under the jurisdiction of consciousness?"

The commentator discards the claim that the effect cannot exert power on its generating cause. "Because consciousness is under the specific jurisdiction," etc. These wise dispositions do not affect the causal power of consciousness, for they destroy only the ignorance and the other afflictions of their [conscious] generating cause. Such is the meaning.

What is clarified also is how the process of destruction of deeds, etc., takes place, namely, by dismissing one of the duties of consciousness. This does not mean that consciousness has been deprived of all its power, because the wise dispositions deprive it only of its first prerogative, make hollow its duty to act [as the subject

of enjoyment]. The reason here is the Discrimination Knowledge, etc., because the activity of consciousness is confined by discriminating cognition. For, when Discrimination Knowledge is not in operation, the acting *puruṣa* does not reach his goal – the Veritable Being. And that Wisdom, having the form of Discrimination Knowledge and continuously germinating in the exalted presence of its disposition, gets accomplished through the rise of Sublime Ataraxy.

This is the meaning.

Notes

[1] The apparent discrepancy in the text of the sūtra flows from the fact that instead of *anya* (different), Bhojarāja and the other five commentators following his line of interpretation read *sāmānya* (universal).

[2] In the case of the Vindhya mountain, there is no arrival (*prāpti*) and, consequently, no going (*gati*). *Prāpti* is the knowledge of the universal connection of particular instances, arrived at with the help of induction, or by revelation. The first meaning of *gati* (according to *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 158) is *going*, the second – *knowledge*, the forth one – *proof*. Hence *gati* is discursive cognition through which we come to know less general instances *via* more general.

[3] The understanding of that clause depends on the way we split up the *sandhis* in *anumānena ca sāmānyenopasaṃharaḥ*. If, along with Vācaspati, we read the phrase as *anumānena* [*ca*] *sāmānyena upasaṃharaḥ*, the translation of the whole sentence will be: "The conclusion is [arrived at] by means of inference and universal." This reading is coherent with the real picture of inferential cognition, but still has the nature of general statement which, notwithstanding its veritability, is not supportive with regard to the argumentation of Vyāsa. If we see the clause as *anumānena ca sāmānye na upasaṃharaḥ*, the sentence will assume the following quite unintelligible form: "And the conclusion [arrived at] by means of inference does not refer to universal," which runs counter to the basic claim of *bhāṣyakāra* and breaks up the natural context, because in that case, the particles *na ca* should have been at the beginning of the sentence. The solution of this puzzle is to be sought in the commentary of Hariharānanda. He moves *na ca* to the end of the sentence, showing in this way that what has been said previously refers

to universal, *and not* to particular. Even more decisive is Vijñāna Bhikṣu explicitly indicating precisely this connection between the words (*anuṣaṅga*).

[4] The text reads: *viṣayameva gocarayet*, *lit*., only this object should be grazed over. *Gocara* is *pasturage* for the senses and the intellect, *horizon* of their possible objects, *sphere* of their operationalization, nourishing them with sense-data and dispositions.

[5] Wherever the pervading general mark (*probans*) is present, we, obeying to the rules of discursive cognition, are to comprise the presence of a substratum (*probandum*) pervaded by that mark. The correct syllogism relies upon the universal connection between *sādhya* and *sādhana*, which is apprehended in its own-being, while in the incorrect syllogism, this connection suffers distortion and deviation, and, as a matter of fact, is no more luminescent – its light is obscured by the filth of argumental semblance (*hetvābhāsa*).

[6] The mark of the deer is its horn.

[7] The Sanskrit text reads: *kathaṅcidocarayataḥ*, where an obvious misprint has been committed. If we read it as *kathaṅcid-gocarayataḥ*, then the translation should run as follows: "Being close and distant, the reality of That *does difficult get in the horizon*," etc. If, on the contrary, we read the text as *kathaṅcid-agocarayataḥ*, the translation should be: "somehow remains *beyond the horizon*." *Pūrvapakṣa* and *pūrvapakṣin* being only alluded to, we shall prefer the first reading, and translate it in a non-committed form, leaving to *Rahasya* the exhaustive explanation of the controversy.

[8] Cf. *Nyāya-darśana* II.2.64-69. *Nyāya-kośa* (p. 115-116) says that *ākṛti* is the manifesting mark of the general, it is what distinguishes one individual substance from another; the particular is the unique configuration of the parts. We can find there a set of refutations discarding the position of the commentators of Yoga, including Vācaspati, to the effect that the particular is something productive (*śakyārtha*) with regard to cognition and should be grasped independently of the universal.

[9] *Atipatita-samasta-mānameya-sīmnaḥ*, having transcended the boundaries of the empirically cognizable, or death-measurable totality.

[10] Death, epithet of many gods, including Brahmā; what is meant here is the elapsing time of the mortal world of Brahmā.

[11] In fact, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not oppose the existence of supersensual contemplation. According to their philosophy, there are two kinds of perception: ordinary, or empirical (*laukika*), and extraordinary (*alaukika*). Ordinary perception is subdivided into *vikalpaka* (indefinite,

possessed of distorted imaginary constructs) and *nirvikalpaka* (definite, devoid of distorted constructs). Extraordinary perception is subdivided into three more kinds according to its object: *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (having for its characteristic the universal), *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* (having for its characteristic the knowledge), and *yogaja-dharma* (being a property born by habituation of *yoga*). The latter is stated to be of two kinds according to the division of *yogins* into *yukta* (those who have accomplished full contact with the Supreme One) and *yuñjāna* (those who are still striving for it, cf. *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, śl. 63-65). Thus the objects of extraordinary perception are the three imperceptibles – the universal, the knowledge of the ultimate *dharmins* (*atoms* and *puruṣas*), and the fact of their being unique and different. The argument of Nyāya does not discard the possibility of perceiving their ultimate specifiers (*antya-viśeṣa*) but vehemently opposes the metaphysical substantiation of *viśeṣa*, because, unlike universals and ultimate substances, it is a product of the differentiating intellect, rather than an eternal metaphysical entity. Eternal, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is the atom, whose ultimate difference with regard to the other atoms is effectuated by the aptly and wisely differentiating intellect. The particular, hence, has a purely cognitive being and does not exist outside the process of differentiation. If one says that it, just like the universal and the ultimate substances, exists and is transcendentally cognized, this would mean that it has the power of producing the knowledge of itself, which is absurd and runs counter the experienced facts. Now, the meaning of the words. *Perfectly* (*atiśaya*) means transcendental excellence; what is *seen* (*dṛṣṭa*) in the contemplation goes over the boundaries of normal experience; *proper* (*svārtha*), belonging to the thing itself – heard, grasped, and arrived at as *causa sui*. *Unswerving mark* (*anatiliṅga*) refers only to this particular object, and not to other entities, hence this *unique mark* does not point to any higher universal or deeper substance. *Perceived by the ear* (*śrotra-vṛttita*) – modified through verbal knowledge. *Having taken once again sāṃsāric form* (*punarādi*) refers to those emancipated *ṛṣis* who, guided by compassion to all living creatures immersed in the ocean of *saṃsāra*, have once again taken birth to help them in casting away the burden of reincarnation. The object itself *runs after* (*anudhāvati*), i.e., gets in discursion, closely pursuits the dictum of the seers, which means that it effectuates it *intentionally* (*saṃkalpāt*), generates it out of its mind (the verb *upasthīyate* contains also the indecent allusion of voiding excrement); this is absurd, because the object in discussion, i.e., the atom, is not

possessed of consciousness. And such an absurd is disseminated by Śruti, which raises doubts both in the power of *yogins* to grasp the particular as independent entity and in the reliability of verbal testimony. Hence the only *reliable* means of getting the ultimate particular is inference, specified by *alaukika-pratyakṣa* born in the distinguishing intellect.

[12] The author of *Nyāya-vārttika* (beginning of VIIth century), and one of the most fervent proponents of the Vaiśeṣika atomistic theory in the controversy with the Buddhist logicians. According to D. N. Sastri, Udyotakara "lacked the philosophical grasp and depth of Vācaspati Miśra. The latter is marked for his meticulous fairness to his opponents, but for Udyotakara no stick was too big to beat his opponent with. Very often he argues by verbal twists which even Vācaspati Miśra, otherwise so reverent to him, feels constrained to criticize" (quoted from *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, p. 304). We are confronted here with one of these rare situations of constrained criticism.

[13] The word *gatitva* is derived from *Bhāṣya* and, therefore, should elucidate it; and actually does it, though in a very sophisticated way. *Gatitva* is comprehended as the universal class of all kinds of progressive motion, then as the second-universal class of all general kinds of going, including cognitive discursivity, and – functionally – as the proper class of inferential procedures. In fact, we have a perfect definition of inference, especially when considering its intentional layers and verbal form. It has two main constituents, *delimitor* and *universal*, which are so closely interrelated that fuse into one another. The delimitor of inference is itself a universal – the general notion of pervasion, i.e., the property of the higher genera to pervade less general instances, including the individual. Therefore, at theoretical level, the delimitor of inference is the universal power of all universals to pervade their genera, species, and individuals. Coming down to individual, the delimitor of inference assumes an empirical and practical form, turning thus into perceived instance, inferential ground, or *probans*. So, at the pragmatic extreme of inferential delimitor, we discover perception.

Now, the other constituent – the universal. Theoretically speaking, it is the object of conclusion. That's why Vijñāna Bhikṣu reads further *sāmānya* in Locative: conclusion *refers to* universal. However, the chronotopic relevance of the word *sāmānyena* points to inference rather than to universal. It shows the functional nature of inference, therefore the word appears in Instrumental case: the inference comes into being *while dealing with* universals. It *proceeds* from one general to another and, doing so, comes back to the perception, this time to the unswerving

rational visualization of the *probandum*, which is not directly perceived by the senses or the simple intellect. The particle *vā* (or) in the definition, has no disjunctive meaning – it points to higher and higher intentional syntheses.

[14] That claim is to be regarded as an attempt to boil down the objections of the opponent made explicit by Bhāvāganeśa, the notorious pupil of Vijñāna Bhikṣu: "If it be urged that because of *puruṣa* being devoid of specifier, how could the said wisdom result in grasping the specifier [of *puruṣa*], the answer is: That is not the case, because, in the final resort, what matters here is the specifics of the various forms of the past, future, and present experiences which are reflections of the material conditions (*upādhi*) of the proper Self, for that specifics is the basis for the mutual discrimination of the liberated, still not liberated, and the perfect *puruṣas*." (*Pradīpikā* I.49[6-8].)

[15] In the ordinary perception, the object is the cause of the subjective perception, therefore the latter is but a kind of passive apprehension. The cause for the rise of *yogaja*-perception is the active position of the subject, while the object remains at the suffering side. That's why, in *yogaja*, there is no trace of physical conjunction (*saṃyoga*), spatial contiguity (*sannikarṣa*), etc. What we have here is a reaching out contact, technically termed *samāpatti*, and translated, for the lack of better term, as *liaison*. It is a (1) military and (2) love connection, there is something (3) accidental and (4) illicit in it, and (5) it denotes the new product of the fusion (just like *sandhi*). These five elements are characteristic of *samāpatti* too, which is (1) an active messenger exposed to the cross-fire of afflictions and karmas on the battlefield of *saṃsāra*; (2) a kind of cognitive Eros, love-participation *into* the own-form of the object; (3) an accidental cognitive encounter, because the result may be reached at any point — and disappear, if not habituated; (4) there is something illicit in it, and this is the persistence of empirical subjectivity (*asmitā*) eagerly striving for enjoyment and self-affirmation; (5) it also denotes the result of the contact, i.e., the new *disposition of mind* leading to suppression of enjoyment and to Discrimination Knowledge, which is the first instrument in the sublation of all cognitive activities. It goes without saying that *samāpatti* is cognitive meditation.

[16] *Daśamastamasītivat*, *lit*., like having counted to ten, just like the situation when the awaiting mother has already entered the tenth month, but the baby is still not there, i.e., *as a child before birth.*

[17] Our *ātman*, as characterized by *nirviśeṣatva*, still awaits to be born in the intentional light of the transcendental Puruṣa.

[18] On this account, following the meaning of what is going to be said in *Yoga-vārttika*, the editor of *Sāṅga-yoga-darśana* points out that the obstruction (*bādha*) of dispositions, achieved through cognitive *yoga*, should be complete, because the nature of the ascending beginningless dispositions is such that they constantly necessitate the rise of ever new cognitive suppressions. Only when the beginningless power of dispositions that obstruct the acquisition of Discrimination Knowledge gets destroyed, we can talk of overpowering them. What Vijñāna Bhikṣu had been having in mind were the notion of *manda* – weakening, retarding, diminuating, but also dissolution of the world. This remark of Gosvāmī Dāmodara Śāstrī can be specified and elaborated on several points. (1) The thesis of the beginningless productivity of dispositions, laid down in *Vārttika*, is based on what is said in Śruti and Smṛti. And since there are no instructions available as to how this power should be overcome, the said thesis is taken advantage of by the opponents, turning thus into *pūrvapakṣa*. Their intention is to show the uselessness of the continued performance of cognitive meditation. (2) That claim is opposed by all the exponents of Yoga, starting from Patañjali, who speaks of preventing the *ascending dispositions*. Vyāsa goes a step further and subsumes all the ascending dispositions under the concept of *vehicle*, but still there is no certainty as to what should be prevented – the vehicle of *ascending dispositions*, the *ascending vehicle* of dispositions, or *what is ascending* due to the dispositional vehicle, i.e., the distorted notions. Vijñāna Bhikṣu brings about a radical turnover in the semantic field of *bādha* (obstruction, obstacle, impediment). It should be understood as a *radical extermination*. The obstruction must oppress not simply this or that ascending disposition. It should neutralize the very possibility of dispositional ascent, be so radical in its preventivity as to turn finally into *obstruction-terminator* (*bādha-śadru*). (3) In this quality, it is synonymous with *manda*, which points to the fact that in order to overcome the dispositions we should overpower the very source of their obstructive power – *rajas* and *tamas*. Practically, that means that the world of empirical knowledge should be desactivated, washed off, anesthesized, converted into pure sattvic reflection. This is accomplished in the state of one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*) of consciousness. But since what is meant here is *buddhi-sattva*, i.e., the intellectual *sattva*, its intentional energy (*prakhyā*), having the own-form of splendor (*prakāśa*), goes on to produce active (though enlightened) dispositions that should also be neutralized. The final involved state of the intellectual *sattva* is technically called *nirudha*. It is a state to be discussed further.

(4) What remains to be clarified here is the central concept of *pratibandhī*. Its technical meaning is "showing the inconsistency of the opponent's doctrine" (*Nyāya-kośa*, p. 534). That's why, upon finishing his commentary to the previous *sūtra*, Vijñāna Bhikṣu – as though out of place – speaks of the constantly rising, ever new senseless talks of the opponents about *yogaja*-perception. Evidently, he feels constrained – by the formal technical meaning of the word *pratibandhī*, appearing in the next *sūtra* – to criticize the ever new dispositions of the *apavādins*, giving thus the secondary, pragmatic-conventional meaning of the expression *ever new disposition* in the introduction of Vyāsa. Thus the whole meaning of the *sūtra* might become purely doctrinal: – "The *siddhāntin*'s disposition born out of that [understanding of *yogaja*-perception] exposes the inconsistency of the dispositions of the others [i.e., of the *apasiddhāntins*]." Such is the controversial background of the *sūtra*. (5) Following the context of the commentaries and judging from the doublet form *bādha-śadru* (its translation as *termination of obstructions* is misleading, it rather means *obstruction-cum-termination*), the substantial meaning of *pratibandhī* coincides with the meaning of *pratibandhaka*. Its technical definition reads, 'contrarelatum to the non-being of what is considered to be a cause' (*kāraṇībhūtābhāva-pratiyogin*). The presence of *pratibandhaka* makes the cause unproductive, or breaks up some properties favorable to the effect (*kāryānukulakiṃciddharma-vighaṭaka*). Hence the correct translation of *pratibandhaka* would be, in the first case, *contraceptor*, and, in the second case, *destroyer*. Anticipating the commentaries, it suffices to say that the wise disposition modulated in the truth-bearing wisdom of *samādhi*, becomes contraceptive with regard to the causal power of the other dispositions.

[19] These three instances should be regarded as consequently gaining in power, rather than as generation series. The opponent, as will be seen later on, prefers to take them as new genetic series.

[20] We optionally take *iti*, translated as *thus*, to separate what has been said by Vyāsa, from the objection of the opponent. Therefore *navo navo*, etc., is rendered as *entirely new*. This translation is corroborated by the verb *jayate* in the end of the clause, which supports the genetic interpretation. Suppose Vyāsa reiterates what has been said in the introduction, then *iti* should be the beginning of his own conclusion. In that case, the translation is to be understood as follows: "Thus the dispositional vehicle gets newer and newer," it gets cleansed, and gains in vigor. This translation is supported by the full-stop after *jayate* and

by the subsequent second *iti*. Anyway, by the lack of any further hints, both translations are plausible.

[21] *Cittaceṣṭitaṃ khyātiparyavasānam* – discriminating cognition puts an end to the expansion of the object-intentional activity of consciousness, which does incessantly posit ever new objects of enjoyment – afferently raising active dispositions – demanding further cognitive suppression – giving birth to new intentional activity, etc., *ad infinitum*. This vicious circle is overcome only after sublating the last active disposition of mind, but this is a much further task. The term 'intentional' is taken here in the broadest phenomenological sense of the word, as noetic-noematic characteristic of consciousness, but also as all-comprising directedness towards the transcendental subject. By reaching that highest transcendental *telos*, the intentional activity of consciousness falls apart, though the very intentionality stays, because the actionless state of the supreme transcendental subject is also intentional. Where might have come from otherwise the quasi-creative God's intention imparting the corresponding impulse to *pradhāna* already brought to equilibrium! It is this state of passive intentionality that is rendered by the said characteristic of Supreme Puruṣa: "Directed towards all, He stays." Intentionality is the fundamental characteristic of all being, both empirical and transcendental. Everything is pervaded by His intention (*prāṇā vai satyaṃ teṣāmeṣa satyam*).

[22] Usually, the pronoun *tat* points to what has been said previously. And since the previous subject-matter is the truth-bearing wisdom, born out of the liaison-wisdom arousing no hesitations, Vācaspati seems to have no formal grounds to skip over one of the links in the causal chain. *Tat* would have to refer to *ṛtambhārā-prajñā* rather than to *nirvicāra-samāpatti*. Otherwise the rise of the former wisdom would be redundant. Here Vācaspati seems to involuntarily overvisualize (*atiparāmṛśati*) the things actually meant. Because what is meant in the following comments is the wise meditative disposition born out of *ṛtambhārā-prajñā*. Yet we are those who, together with the opponents of Vyāsa, are running the risk to be blinded by the light of verbal overvisualization. Here *Vācaspatya* is of no help, because it remains esoteric in every detail concerning the opponent's argumentation. The secret is revealed by *Rahasya*, thus deserving its name. The exoteric commentary of Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī makes it clear that the wise *samādhi* disposition in fact is not *generated* by the *ṛtambhārā-prajñā*; it is not genetically derived from *ṛtambhāra*, as one might be inclined to think judging from the word *jayate* in *Bhāṣya*. The said "ever new" disposition has but new

brilliance and power. What happens, in fact, is a radical transformation of the disposition born out of *nirvicāra-samāpatti.* Hence we have no right to speak of genetic chain in the form of *nirvicāra-samāpatti – saṃskāra – ṛtambhārā-prajñā. – saṃskāra*, etc., because, as already mentioned, such an oversimplified genetic relation would stipulate the rise of an endless circle of dispositions and cognitive suppressions. Genetic relations loose their productivity somewhere between the second and the third link. This boundary is represented by the truth-bearing disposition, which is the starting point of the proper *samādhi*. In terms of phenomenology, this is the frontier between the phenomenological-psychological and the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In the phenomenological *Einstellung*, a radical turn of consciousness takes place. Having performed its first duty, to reduce all object-tinted data of experience to the pure empirical subjectivity, now it is forwarding toward its second duty – the cognition of the pure transcendental subject. It goes without saying that such transcendental purity is dubious, because beginningless are the seeds of enjoyment. Yet Yoga regards them as obstacles that can be removed only by ever new dispositional shifts in the wisdom of *samādhi*, until their final extermination is reached. At a certain stage of his philosophical development, Husserl also believes that this instrument has to pave the way to transcendental subjectivity. Later on, he comes to the disappointing conclusion that, due to their socio-pragmatic nature, the empirical dispositions are reproduced at the level of transcendental subjectivity and create thus a new 'object' for the transcendental-reductive attitude, the so-called *Lebenswelt*. The consciousness needs a new radical turn to suppress the socio-practical sway of the dispositions. The same conclusion is reached by Yoga thinkers, as will be seen from the commentaries to the last *sūtra* of *Samādhi-pāda*. As for the interpretation of Vācaspati, substantially, he is absolutely right – *tat* refers to *nirvicāra-samāpatti*.

[23] *Bhūtārthapakṣapāto hi dhīyāṃ svabhāvaḥ*. (Sic se res habet Brentano!) Consciousness (*dhī*) is taken here as the power of contemplation, i.e., as universal intellection, of which *citta* is but an empirically evolved reflection.

[24] *Bāhyā – standing outside*, presumably, Jainas or the materialists. Vācaspati would not decorate in this way the proponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or Vedānta, because they make part of the tradition; or the Buddhists, whose philosophy is so close to him. But the Jainas and the Lokāyatikas do not recognize the theory of the beginningless illusion, while the Buddhists banish the permanent subject. Hence, judging from

the terminology, we are led to suppose that the said "outsiders" are but the logicians of Nyāya. They take opposition to Vyāsa and use as an argument the idea of the intentional directedness of consciousness.

[25] *Nirvicāra-samāpatti*, just like the living entities, has a beginning and is born but in pain. What is born out of it is the truth-bearing disposition, which should be turned into *abādhikā*, removing the obstacles and being itself not an obstacle on the way to the sublime generation of higher and beginningless Knowledge of Discrimination between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Since the cause has a beginning, the effect of it should also be *sādi*; and there is no means capable of turning it into *anādi*. In the conclusion, the word *api* points out that everything should be understood *also* in karmic sense. Life, with all its phenomena, is marked by the beginningless *avidyā*, pushing the *anādi* vehicle of afflictions and deeds. Everything born out of it could not generate a radically new mechanism as to put out of power the karmic vehicle, because the effect has the nature of its cause. Hence the dispositions born in the wisdom of *samādhi* and marked by the beginningless *avidyā* will continuously obstruct the acquisition of Discrimination Knowledge. That is the controversial context out of which strings the next *sūtra*.

[26] *Bādhata eva* – does really hamper the acquisition of Discrimination Knowledge. Consciousness is not capable of suppressing all the ascending dispositions, because conscious restraint itself is an act that generates ever new dispositions. The solution is to be sought in the suppression of active consciousness, but this cannot be effectuated all at once, because there are as many forms of intentionality as entities to be referred to. From intentional point of view, the development of the Universe takes the triadic form of thesis – antithesis – synthesis. First of all, we have the *passive subjective-transcendental intentionality* (of Puruṣa, the Sublime Thesis, the Pure Vidyā). It incites the *active object-cosmological intentionality* (of *prakṛti*, the beginningless unreflected Ontological Antithesis, Avidyā) assuming grosser and grosser forms in the course of evolution, until it arrives at the *active anthropic intentionality* (of man, the end-station of evolution, the empirical self-reflecting Synthesis, which is not aware of the difference between Thesis and Antithesis; let's call it Bhramaṇa). This empirical being is constantly roving about, turning round, swerving, dwelling in unsteadiness, staggering, and erring. Now the play of thesis – antithesis – synthesis is started again, this time in the field of cognition. First of all comes the *active object-intentionality* of the empirical cognition, where the Self is passively dragged by the object of senses, or, simply, by *saṃsāra*. This

thetic state is Bhoga (enjoyment) of all external objects, both gross and subtle, including – and, as a matter of essence, reduced to – Alter Ego, for the ultimate goal of all intentional activities is the cognition of the Ego. *Nirvitarka-samāpatti* exterminates the doubts concerning the external gross objects, *nirvicāra-samāpatti* eradicates the hesitations concerning the external subtle objects. We come thus to the antithesis of *active subject-intentionality*; Bhoga should be exterminated, because, in the presence of obstructions, there is no rise of the Higher. By progressive accumulation of tattvic knowledge, i.e., by active seizing on the own-form of the real entities (*tattva*) the attitude of consciousness becomes actively impeding. The implemented result of this active intentionality is Khyāti (discriminating cognition). Here starts the proper Yoga of action. What remains to be done is to cancel every intentional action in the pacifying milieu of the *passive subject-transcendental intentionality* and reach out for the Ultimate Synthesis through self-surrending participation in the own-form of Puruṣa.

[27] *Viparyaya* is modification of consciousness in the form of futile knowledge missing the adequate essence of the thing cognized. These unproductive notions divide into (1) notions constantly reproduced because of the endless transmigration, i.e., thanks to *avidyā*; (2) notions produced by defects in the material instruments of sense-knowledge; (3) notions whose converted form flows from defects persisting in the threefold internal organ of cognition; and (4) notions generated by defects in the leaning objects of meditation. Reference here is made to the Buddhist Yogācāra classification of the causes (*pratyaya*) of cognition.

[28] The premises of the opponent, laid down in *Vācaspatya*, are not flawless, because he is wrong in saying '*samādhiprajñāprasavahetu'* – genetic ground for the wisdom of *samādhi.* Here the *siddhāntin* would rather say '*samādhiprajñā'prasavahetu'* – non-genetic (*Rahasya* deciphers this word as *asāvitya*) ground for the wisdom of *samādhi*. But still the opponent is right, because he has no intention to say that the *wisdom of samādhi* is born out of the overpowering. What he actually says is that overpowering is instrumental cause, *hetu*, generating *reason* for the rise of that wisdom, whose material cause is something else.

[29] Bringing wisdom *seriatim* to self-communication and accomplishment (*saṃprajñāta-paramparāyā*). When not sticking to the technical meaning of the words, the answer is to be implicitly derived from the argument.

[30] Cf. *Bhāvāganeśa-vṛtti* I.50[3-4]: "*Born out of that,* the disposition generated by the wisdom of *samādhi* which has the base-form of one-

pointed self-evidence is a mnemic stand (*smṛti*) preventing the other dispositions and generally known as *kārya-virodhī* (contraposing, fighting the effects)."

[31] *When contracepted, they become subtle* (see YS II.10-11). All ascending dispositions take rise in *avidyā*. When the obstacle of ignorant disposition is removed, there comes the Lack of Obstruction, then the Sublime Generation of the Higher Beginningless Cognition. With its strengthening, the wise dispositions gradually get absorbed into their subtle cause.

[32] Cf. *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra* V.82. What remains after the destruction of hedonistic disposition is the pure enjoyment of discriminating cognition, granting access to transcendental powers like attenuation, i.e., physical penetration into the fine-structures of quantum-mechanical cosmology, telekinesis, control over gravitation, etc. These powers give a new kick to the whirling afflictions and deeds, re-commenced thus at a new, subjective-transcendental level of active intentionality.